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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature Of The Case
John Mullins appeals the district court’s Minute Entry & Order Of Probation
entered after Mullins pled guilty to possession of a controlled substance,
methamphetamine. Mullins argues the district court erred when it denied his motion to
suppress.

Statement Of The Facts And Course Of The Proceedings
On March 1, 2017, John Mullins and his wife arrived at the federal courthouse in
Pocatello in their pickup truck. (Tr., p.20, Ls.21-24; p.35, L.15 – p.37, L.3.) Mullins
walked through the courthouse door carrying a backpack and then handed it off to his wife.
(Tr., p.24, Ls.9-20.) The Mullinses placed their personal effects, including the backpack,
on the x-ray machine used by the court security officers. (Tr., p.22, L.20 – p.23, L.13.)
CSO Bunderson used the x-ray machine to scan the items. (Id.) He saw “three
dark spots that had no definite outline” that he could not identify in the x-ray scan of the
backpack. (Tr., p.23, L.14 – p.24, L.8.) He asked Mullins’s wife if he could look in the
backpack to identify the objects. (Tr., p.24, L.24 – p.26, L.13.) She said, “yeah.” (Id.)
When CSO Bunderson opened the bag, he saw “a brownish vial” that had “a white
powdery substance inside.” (Tr., p.24, L.24 – p.26, L.13; p.26, L.24 – p.27, L.5.) Based
on CSO Bunderson’s 34 years of experience with the Idaho State Police, the substance in
the vial “appeared to be a controlled substance.” (Tr., p.24, L.24 – p.26, L.19.) CSO
Bunderson immediately radioed a Deputy U.S. Marshall, and the Deputy U.S. Marshall
called the Pocatello Police. (Tr., p.28, L.1 – p.29, L.1.)
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As CSO Bunderson continued looking through the backpack to identify the three
objects, he found “50 to 100” small baggies, which were consistent with baggies “used in
an illegal drug trade.” (Tr., p.28, L.1 – p.29, L.13.) He put everything back in the backpack
except the vial and the baggies. (Tr., p.29, L.17 – p.30, L.8.) He “put the vial and those
little baggies just on the counter in plain view . . . and within a few minutes the police
department was there.” (Id.)
Officer Edwards from the Pocatello Police Department conducted a field test of the
suspected controlled substance, and it tested presumptive positive for methamphetamine.
(Tr., p.61, L.18 – p.62, L.3.) Officer Diekemper from the Pocatello Police Department
placed Mullins and his wife under arrest for possession of methamphetamine. (Id.) The
officers seized the suspected methamphetamine, the baggies, and $403 from the Mullinses.
(Tr., p.64, L.15 – p.65, L.10.) At the request of Mullins’s wife, Officer Edwards placed
the rest of the Mullinses’ personal effects, including the backpack, back in the pickup. (Id.)
The officers called a K-9 unit to conduct an exterior sniff of the pickup. (Tr., p.62,
L.9 – p.63, L.8.) They believed that the Mullinses could have more drugs in the pickup
because the small amount of methamphetamine in the vial “would be more of a personal
use amount, but the sixty-five unused, clean baggies with that vial is . . . indicative of a
person that could be distributing or selling methamphetamine.” (Tr., p.63, L.9 – p.64, L.1.)
The drug dog alerted on the pickup. (Tr., p.65, L.19 – p.66, L.8.)
Armed with the information from the investigation, Officer Diekemper sought a
search warrant for the pickup. (Id.) In his affidavit, Officer Diekemper provided a factual
basis for the search warrant, including the following:
4. Pocatello Police Detective Edwards examined the tray of personal effects
that [Mullins] and [his wife] had submitted to the Court Security Officers
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for inspection. Detective Edwards observed 65 small plastic baggies, $403
in US currency and a small brown vial with a white crystalline substance.
Detective Edwards located identifying documents for both [Mullins] and
[his wife] in the pink and brown backpack.
5. Detective Edwards conducted a field test of the material in the vial and
this test resulted in a presumptive positive for methamphetamine. . . .
6. . . . The suspected methamphetamine, US currency, and drug
paraphernalia were seized by Detective Edwards. At the request of
[Mullins’s wife], Detective Edwards placed the Mullins’ personal effects
into their pickup . . . .
7. [Mullins and his wife were incarcerated.]
8. Your affiant called Pocatello Police Officer Sean Peterson and requested
he respond to the Federal Courthouse . . . for the purpose of deploying his
state certified drug detection dog on an exterior sniff of the aforementioned
pickup . . . . Officer Peterson did deploy his state certified drug detection
dog on an exterior sniff of the pickup resulting in a positive indication to
the presence of illegal controlled substances, either heroin,
methamphetamine, cocaine or marijuana.
(R., pp.16-17.)
A magistrate signed a search warrant for the pickup. (R., p.18.) Pursuant to the
warrant, the officers searched Mullins’s pickup. (Tr., p.101, Ls.15-19.) They found “two
additional vials or glass containers that had suspected methamphetamine,” two pipes that
“appeared to be suspected methamphetamine pipes,” $1000 in U.S. currency, and other
miscellaneous items. (Tr., p.101, L.25 – p.103, L.2.)
The state charged Mullins with possession of a controlled substance with intent to
deliver, methamphetamine. (R., p.57.) Mullins moved to suppress “any and all evidence
obtained by officers resulting from the search of defendant’s vehicle.” (R., p.91-92.)
According to Mullins, “the search warrant issued in this case was partly based upon tainted
evidence utilizing a drug dog’s alert on the vehicle after police placed a backpack that
contained drugs into the vehicle.” (Id.)
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After an evidentiary hearing, the district court denied Mullins’s motion to suppress
on two separate, independent grounds. (R., p.103-06.) First, the district court found that
Mullins “failed to prove by a preponderance of evidence that the information . . . omitted
from the affidavit was done intentionally or recklessly in order to mislead the magistrate
in his determination of probable cause to issue the search warrant.” (R., p.106.) Second,
the district found that, even without the drug dog detection, “there is still sufficient
information for the magistrate to conclude probable cause existed to issue the search
warrant.” (Id.)
Mullins pled guilty to possession of a controlled substance, methamphetamine, and
reserved his right to appeal the district court’s denial of his motion to suppress. (R., pp.14041.) The district court withheld judgment and placed Mullins on probation for a period of
four years. (R., p.153.) Mullins timely appealed. (R., pp.163-66.)
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ISSUE
Mullins states the issue on appeal as:
Did the district court err when it denied Mr. Mullins’ motion to suppress?
(Appellant’s brief, p.4.)
The state rephrases the issue as:
Has Mullins failed to show that the district court erred when it denied his motion to
suppress?
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ARGUMENT
Mullins Failed To Show The District Court Erred By Denying His Motion To Suppress
A.

Introduction
The district court properly rejected Mullins’s attack on the affidavit underlying the

warrant that authorized a search of his truck. In Franks v. Delaware, 438 U.S. 154 (1978),
the U.S. Supreme Court held that a defendant may invalidate a search warrant by showing:
(1) the search-warrant affidavit “contain[ed] a deliberately or reckless false statement” and
(2) the false statement was material to the probable cause determination. 1 438 U.S. at 16465, 171. The Idaho Supreme Court subsequently held that “Franks should apply to the
omission as well as the inclusion of information in affidavits.” State v. Guzman, 122 Idaho
981, 983-84, 842 P.2d 660, 662-63 (1992). Mullins attempted to satisfy his two-prong
burden under Franks by arguing that Officer Diekemper failed to inform the magistrate that
the officers put a backpack from which they had retrieved methamphetamine back into
Mullins’s truck prior to using the drug dog and that the drug dog could alert to the residual
1

The Supreme Court held in Franks that, before a court holds an evidentiary hearing on an
attack of a search warrant affidavit, “[t]here must be allegations of deliberate falsehood or
of reckless disregard for the truth, and those allegations must be accompanied by an offer
of proof.” 438 U.S. at 171. That did not happen here. Instead, Mullins filed a motion to
suppress based on a different theory: “the search warrant was based upon tainted evidence.”
(R., p.91.) At the evidentiary hearing on the motion, the state expressed confusion as to
the type of motion Mullins had filed. (Tr., p.8, L.24 – p.9, L.14.) Mullins responded that
he was “not sure” but that it was “[m]aybe” a motion to dismiss. (Tr., p.10, L.25 – p.11,
L.5.) He explained that he was relying on State v. Bunting, 142 Idaho 908, 136 P.3d 379
(Ct. App. 2006). (Tr., p.17, Ls.10-20.) Bunting is not a Franks case. See Bunting, 142
Idaho at 915, 136 P.3d at 386 (invalidating warrant because it was procured based on
evidence obtained in violation of the Fourth Amendment). At some point during the
evidentiary hearing that Mullins, frankly, did not deserve under Franks, his argument
morphed into an attack on the veracity of the underlying affidavit. (E.g., Tr., p.115, Ls.317.) Having never mentioned Franks, or any case related to Franks, in the district court,
Mullins now features it front-and-center on appeal: “He claims the warrant was invalid
under Franks . . . .” (Appellant’s brief, p.1.)
6

odor of the methamphetamine found in the backpack. The district court correctly found
that Mullins failed to satisfy either prong.
Mullins failed to show Officer Deikemper deliberately or recklessly omitted any
relevant information from the affidavit. The affidavit informed the magistrate that the
officers found methamphetamine in the backpack and that the officers put the Mullinses’
“personal effects” back into the truck before using the drug dog. (R., p.16.) Officer
Deikemper’s decision to use the general phrase “personal effects” instead of listing out
each item returned to the truck does not show an intentional or reckless omission of the
truth. Moreover, Mullins failed to prove that Officer Deikemper knew or should have
known that the drug dog could alert on the residual odor in the backpack. He could not
have deliberately or recklessly omitted information that he neither knew nor should have
known.
Mullins also failed to show the information allegedly omitted from the affidavit
was material to the magistrate’s probable cause determination. As the affidavit explained,
prior to using the drug dog, the officers seized a vial containing methamphetamine, 65
small baggies, and a large sum of money from the Mullinses. That evidence gave the
officers probable cause to search Mullins’s truck for additional contraband. Because the
drug dog alert was not necessary to establish probable cause, the information allegedly
omitted from the affidavit that undermined the drug dog’s alert was not material to the
probable cause determination.
B.

Standard Of Review
This Court reviews the two Franks inquiries using different standards of review.

“The [first] inquiry—whether a statement or omission was intentional or reckless—
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presents a question of fact, and [this Court] will not disturb the lower court’s finding
without clear error.” State v. Brown, 155 Idaho 423, 428, 313 P.3d 751, 756 (Ct. App.
2013). “Factual Findings supported by substantial and competent evidence are not clearly
erroneous.”

State v. Downing, 163 Idaho 26, ___, 407 P.3d 1285, 1288 (2017).

“Substantial and competent evidence is ‘relevant evidence that a reasonable mind might
accept to support a conclusion.’” Huff v. Singleton, 143 Idaho 498, 500, 148 P.3d 1244,
1246 (2006) (quoting Jensen v. City of Pocatello, 135 Idaho 406, 412, 18 P.3d 211, 217
(2000)).
“The second query—whether the statement or omission was material—is an issue
of law that [this Court] review[s] freely.” Brown, 155 Idaho at 429, 313 P.3d at 757. But,
“[i]n reviewing the district court’s determination that misstatements and omitted
information were immaterial and unnecessary to a finding of probable cause, [this Court]
defer[s] to factual findings which are supported by substantial evidence.”

State v.

Thompson, 121 Idaho 638, 640, 826 P.2d 1350, 1352 (Ct. App. 1992).
C.

Mullins Failed To Carry His Burden On Either Franks Inquiry
The district court did not err when it denied Mullins’s challenge to Officer

Diekemper’s affidavit. To successfully attack a search-warrant affidavit under Franks, a
defendant must show a “false representation or omission was made knowingly and
intentionally or with reckless disregard for the truth and . . . the facts wrongfully included
or omitted were material to the magistrate’s finding of probable cause for issuance of the
warrant.” State v. Rozajewski, 159 Idaho 261, 264, 359 P.3d 1058, 1061 (Ct. App. 2015)
(emphasis in original). Mullins failed to make either showing.
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1.

Mullins Failed To Show Clear Error In The District Court’s Finding That
Any Omission Of Relevant Information From The Affidavit Was Not Done
Intentionally Or Recklessly

Mullins failed to show Officer Diekemper omitted relevant information in the
affidavit intentionally or with reckless disregard for the truth. “[T]he defendant bears the
burden to prove, by a preponderance of the evidence, that . . . material exculpatory
information was deliberately or recklessly omitted” from the affidavit. State v. Peterson,
133 Idaho 44, 47, 981 P.2d 1154, 1157 (Ct. App. 1999). “[M]erely negligent or innocent
mistakes . . . do not invalidate a warrant.” Id. The district court found any omission of
relevant information in the affidavit was not “done intentionally or recklessly.” (R., p.106.)
Mullins can thus prevail on appeal only if he shows clear error in the district court’s finding.
Brown, 155 Idaho at 428, 313 P.3d at 756. He cannot do so.
Mullins’s argument on appeal that the district court’s finding was clearly erroneous
is foreclosed by his concession at the evidentiary hearing that the evidence did not rise even
to the level of negligence on the part of Officer Diekemper. After the presentation of the
evidence, the district court asked Mullins’s counsel whether he “believe[d] that the
detectives placed that backpack back in there and purposely did not disclose that to the
magistrate.” (Tr., p.121, Ls.15-19.) Mullins’s counsel responded: “I can’t say that, Your
Honor. I mean, I don’t know. It could have been just, you know, just – not negligence but
just, you know, them thinking personal effects and not thinking that they needed to
specify.” (Tr., p.121, Ls.20-25.)
The record confirms the wisdom of Mullins’s fatal concession. The affidavit
informed the magistrate that the officers found the suspected methamphetamine in the
backpack. (R., p.16.) The affidavit also disclosed to the magistrate that, after finding the
suspected methamphetamine and prior to the officers using the drug dog, “[a]t the request
9

of [Mullin’s wife], Detective Edwards placed the Mullins’ [sic] personal effects into their
pickup.” (Id.)
Mullins takes issue with Officer Diekemper’s use of the “generalized term
‘personal effects’” and argues he should have specified the backpack had been placed back
in the truck. (Appellant’s brief, p.7.) But Officer Diekemper testified at the hearing that,
although “it may not be clear,” the phrase “personal effects . . . is an intended reference
back to the backpack and personal effects in the trays.” (Tr., p.77, L.20 – p.78, L.10.)
Officer Diekemper’s testimony, which is entirely consistent with the language of the
affidavit, 2 proves he did not deliberately or recklessly omit information from his affidavit
and constitutes substantial evidence in support of the district court’s finding.
Furthermore, while listing out the personal effects that were placed back into the
truck may have been more informative, the issue is not whether Officer Diekemper could
have written a better affidavit but whether Mullins has shown that Officer Diekemper
deliberately or recklessly omitted information. See Rozajewski, 159 Idaho at 264, 359
P.3d at 1061. “A ‘poor choice of words’ alone doesn’t meet this standard . . . .” United
States v. Huang, No. 12-1246 WJ, 2014 WL 12796916, at *5 (D.N.M. Apr. 16, 2014); see
United States v. Curry, 911 F.2d 72, 76 (8th Cir. 1990) (holding defendant could not satisfy
Franks burden where officer “admitted that his choice of words in the challenged portion
of the affidavit was poor . . . [a]bsent other evidence demonstrating more than negligence”);
State v. Tuttle, 515 S.W.3d 282, 309 (Tenn. 2017) (holding officer’s erroneous use of

2

A backpack falls well within the scope of the phrase “personal effects.” See MerriamWebster
Online
Dictionary,
https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/
personal%20effects (last visited July 18, 2018) (defining personal effects as “privately
owned items (such as clothing and jewelry) normally worn or carried on the person”).
10

“residence” instead of “property” in affidavit, “although admittedly imprecise and perhaps
resulting from negligence, does not constitute a false statement”). Officer Diekemper
“us[ing] the generalized term ‘personal effects’ to describe what was placed in the truck”
(Appellant’s brief, p.7), at worst, amounts to a poor choice of words, which does not
invalidate a search warrant affidavit. See Curry, 911 F.2d at 76; Tuttle, 515 S.W.3d at 309.
Mullins also argues that Officer Diekemper should have included in the affidavit
that the drug dog was “able to detect the residual odor” in the backpack. (Appellant’s brief,
p.7.) But there is no indication in the record that Officer Diekemper knew or should have
known that the drug dog was able to detect the residual odor in the specific circumstances
of this case. Only Officer Peterson testified to the drug dog’s capabilities, and he testified
that his knowledge was based on specialized training for officers assigned to the K-9 unit.
(Tr., p.81, Ls.9-12; p.84, Ls.15-24.) Nothing in the record suggests Officer Diekemper is
or has ever been assigned to the K-9 unit, and Officer Peterson’s only involvement in the
investigation was deploying his drug dog and informing Officer Diekemper of his drug
dog’s positive indication. 3 (Tr., p.86, L.3 – p.88, L.3.) Officer Diekemper could not have
deliberately or recklessly omitted information that he neither knew nor should have known.
See, e.g., Franks, 438 U.S. at 163 (observing that “claimed misstatements in the search
warrant affidavit . . ., ‘not being within the personal knowledge of the affiant, did not go to
the integrity of the affidavit’”); United States v. Barnes, 126 F. Supp. 3d 735, 741 (E.D.
La. 2015) (“In this situation, the officer’s sole responsibility is to attest to facts within his
or her personal knowledge.”); cf. Chism v. Washington State, 661 F.3d 380, 388 (9th Cir.

3

The two investigating officers were Officer Diekemper and Officer Edwards. (Tr., p.64,
Ls.2-5.) Officer Peterson arrived on the scene after Officer Edwards had placed the
backpack in the truck. (Tr., p.98, Ls.8-10; p.100, L.11 – p.101, L.14.)
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2011) (“The most commonsense evidence that the officers acted with at least a reckless
disregard for the truth is that the omissions and false statements contained in the affidavit
were all facts that were within [the affiant’s] personal knowledge.”).
Furthermore, Mullins points to no evidence showing this so-called omission was
intentional or reckless. Instead, citing Peterson, he erroneously attempts to rely solely on
an inference he asks this Court to draw based on the relative importance of the alleged
omission. (Appellant’s brief, pp.7-8.) In Peterson, the Idaho Court of Appeals held that
“[w]hether an omission was intentional or reckless might be inferred, in part, from the
relative importance of the information and its exculpatory power.” 133 Idaho at 48, 981
P.2d at 1158 (emphasis added). The court’s “in part” qualification makes clear that a
defendant cannot rely wholly on the inference to prove deliberateness or recklessness. See
id. Were it otherwise, the first Franks prong (i.e., whether the omission was intentional or
reckless) would collapse entirely into the second Franks prong (i.e., whether the omission
was material). In any event, there is no inference to draw here because the information that
Officer Diekemper allegedly omitted from the affidavit is neither relatively important nor
exculpatory. See infra Part I.C.2.
The district court found that Mullins failed to prove any omission from the affidavit
“was done intentionally or recklessly.” (R., p.106.) That finding is supported by the
record, including Officer Diekemper’s testimony. Mullins has failed to point to any
evidence to the contrary on appeal. He has fallen far short of showing clear error.
2.

Mullins Failed To Show That The Information Allegedly Omitted From
Officer Diekemper’s Affidavit Was Material

Mullins’s attack on Officer Diekemper’s affidavit also fails because Mullins failed
to show the information allegedly omitted from the affidavit was material.
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See

Rozajewski, 159 Idaho at 264, 359 P.3d at 1061. “Omitted information is material only if
there is a substantial probability that, had the omitted information been presented, it would
have altered the magistrate’s finding of probable cause.” Brown, 155 Idaho at 428, 313
P.3d at 756. Mullins alleges that Officer Diekemper omitted information that undermined
the drug dog’s alert on the vehicle. (Appellant’s brief, pp.8-11.) That information is not
material, however, because the affidavit provided the magistrate with a sufficient factual
basis for probable cause without the drug dog’s alert.
The evidence seized from the Mullinses inside of the courthouse—long before the
drug dog appeared on the scene—was sufficient, standing alone, to support the magistrate’s
probable cause determination. The probable cause standard to search a vehicle “is satisfied
when a police officer lawfully searches a vehicle’s recent occupant and finds contraband
on his person.” United States v. Baker, 719 F.3d 313, 319 (4th Cir. 2013); see United
States v. Barnett, 414 F. App’x 17, 19 (9th Cir. 2011) (holding vial containing a white
residue found on the defendant’s person “gave the officer probable cause to think that there
were more drugs in the truck”); United States v. Johnson, 383 F.3d 538, 545-46 (7th Cir.
2004) (“[The officer’s] discovery of a banned substance (drugs) on Johnson’s person
clearly provided him with probable cause to search the trunk of the vehicle . . . .” (footnote
omitted)).
Here, the methamphetamine and suspected drug paraphernalia seized from the
Mullinses in the courthouse shortly after they got out of their truck gave the magistrate a
factual basis to find probable cause. The affidavit presented to the magistrate contained
the following facts: Mullins and his wife arrived at the courthouse in a “pickup.” (R., p.16.)
They “admitted . . . that they entered the Federal Courthouse together with [Mullins’s wife]
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in possession of a pink and brown backpack that [Mullins’s wife] had submitted for
search.” (Id.) The officers “located identifying documents for both [Mullins and his wife]
in the pink and brown backpack.” (Id.) A search of the backpack revealed “65 small plastic
baggies and a vial containing a white crystalline substance.” (Id.) The white crystalline
substance weighed 0.2 grams, and a field test on the substance “resulted in a presumptive
positive for methamphetamine.” (Id.) The officers also found “$403” in the tray submitted
to courthouse security by the Mullinses. (Id.)
The affidavit also contained observations from Officer Diekemper “[b]ased upon
[his] training experience and participation in these and other financial/drug trafficking
investigations.” (R., p.13.) These observations included that “[i]ndividuals involved in
the manufacture or distribution of controlled substances almost always keep paraphernalia
for . . . packaging . . . and distribution of their illegal drugs” including “glassware, tubing,
. . . and packaging materials” (R., p.14); that “[i]ndividuals involved in the manufacture
or distribution of illegal controlled substances commonly maintain amounts of money . . .
which are proceeds from or intended to be used to facilitate drug transactions” (id.); and
that “[i]ndividuals who manufacture and distribute illegal controlled substances commonly
secrete contraband, including other illicit drugs, the proceeds of drug sales and records of
drug transactions . . . in their vehicles” (R., p.15.).
As the district court found, “$403, the sixty-five clean baggies, and the suspected
methamphetamine certainly gave them probable cause” to search the truck. (Tr., p.116,
L.6-12.) The methamphetamine, the large amount of cash, and the 65 baggies is “indicative
of a person that could be distributing or selling methamphetamine.” (Tr., p.63, L.9 – p.64,
L.1.) That drug evidence sufficed for the magistrate to determine that the officers had
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probable cause to search for additional contraband in the truck the Mullinses had just exited
immediately prior to entering the courthouse. 4 See Baker, 719 F.3d at 319 (“[H]aving
found drugs, as well as other items indicating involvement in the drug trade, on Brown’s
person, [the officer] had probable cause to search the passenger compartment of the vehicle
in which Brown had just been sitting for additional contraband.”); United States v. Pineda,
999 F. Supp. 2d 982, 990 (M.D. Tenn. 2014) (“Upon finding drugs on the Defendant’s
person, officer’s had probable cause to seize the Defendant’s cell phone and search the
vehicle that the Defendants drove to the residence.”). Because the magistrate could have
found probable cause without the drug dog’s alert at all, the information allegedly omitted
from the affidavit that undermined the reliability of the drug dog’s alert was not material
to the probable cause determination.
Mullins argues that “the test for materiality of a wrongful omission . . . is not
whether the magistrate could still have issued the warrant, but whether there is a
‘substantial probability’ that the magistrate would have decided not to.” (Appellant’s brief,
p.8-9 (quoting Brown, 155 Idaho at 428, 313 P.3d at 756).) That is a distinction without a
difference. If the omitted information had been presented to the magistrate and, even in
light of the omitted information, probable cause still would have existed, there is no
likelihood that the magistrate would have reached a different conclusion—much less a
substantial likelihood. Indeed, in practice, Idaho’s appellate courts have applied the

4

Mullins suggests this evidence is not sufficient because the police found only “a personal
use amount of suspected methamphetamine.” (Appellant’s brief, p.10.) But as Officer
Diekemper explained, they believed Mullins had more contraband, at least in part, because
they had only found a personal use amount of methamphetamine in the backpack whereas
the baggies and large amount of cash strongly indicated that Mullins was involved in
selling methamphetamine. (Tr., p.63, L.9 – p.64, L.1.)
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materiality test for omitted information by asking whether probable cause still would have
existed if the omitted information had been provided. See, e.g., State v. Kay, 129 Idaho
507, 514, 927 P.2d 897, 904 (Ct. App. 1996) (“Having determined that there are statements
in Detective Dudley’s affidavit which must be disregarded and that exculpatory
information was improperly omitted, we must examine whether, after correcting these
flaws, the affidavit still demonstrates probable cause.”); Thompson, 121 Idaho at 641, 826
P.2d at 1353 (finding omitted information immaterial because, “[e]ven if” the district court
had been presented the omitted information, “there was probable cause to issue the search
warrant”); State v. Jardine, 118 Idaho 288, 293, 796 P.2d 165, 170 (Ct. App. 1990) (“The
question remaining is whether there was a substantial basis to support a finding of probable
cause if the omitted information had been supplied in the affidavit.”). Here, the information
allegedly omitted from the affidavit cannot be material because, even if Officer Diekemper
had included the information in his affidavit, probable cause still would have existed based
on the methamphetamine and suspected drug paraphernalia seized in the courthouse.
Mullins also erroneously asserts that the information allegedly omitted from the
affidavit that undermined the drug dog’s alert “was crucial to the magistrate’s
determination” because “a reliable drug dog alert is deemed sufficient, in and of itself, to
establish probable cause to search a vehicle.” (Appellant’s brief, p.9. (emphasis added).)
His assertion misses the point. Even assuming, as Mullins suggests, that the information
allegedly omitted from the affidavit proved the drug dog alert unreliable, the relevant
question for materiality is not whether the drug dog alert was sufficient to establish
probable cause but whether it was necessary. See, e.g., Jardine, 118 Idaho at 293, 796 P.2d
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at 170. As explained above, the drug dog alert was not necessary to establish probable
cause given the evidence already seized from the Mullinses.
Furthermore, the allegedly unreliable drug dog alert could not have extinguished
the already-established probable cause.

Probable cause “may be dissipated if the

investigating officer later learns additional information that decreases the likelihood” that
evidence will be found. State v. Anderson, 154 Idaho 703, 707, 302 P.3d 328, 332 (2012)
(quoting United States v. Ortiz-Hernandez, 427 F.3d 567, 574 (9th Cir. 2005)). “The police
may learn, for instance, that contraband is no longer located at the place to be searched.”
United States v. Grubbs, 547 U.S. 90, 95 n.2 (2006).
Unlike a drug dog’s failure to alert, a drug dog’s unreliable positive alert cannot
decrease the likelihood that drugs will be found. A drug dog’s failure to alert may
affirmatively indicate the absence of drugs because it suggests the dog could not smell any
drugs. See Anderson, 154 Idaho at 708, 302 P.3d at 333 (“[T]he drug dog’s subsequent
failure to alert may call its initial alert into some question in the mind of a reasonable
person.”). A drug dog’s positive alert, on the other hand, affirmatively indicates the
presence of drugs. See Anderson, 154 Idaho at 706, 302 P.3d at 331 (“A reliable drug
dog’s alert on the exterior of a vehicle is sufficient, in and of itself, to establish probable
cause for a warrantless search of the interior.”). Evidence “that may detract from the
reliability of the dog’s performance properly goes to the ‘credibility’ of the dog—that is,
the weight to be given the dog’s alert.” United States v. Howard, 621 F.3d 433, 447 (6th
Cir. 2010) (emphasis in original) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). Thus,
even overwhelming evidence of the unreliability of a drug dog’s positive alert may lessen
(or completely eliminate) the probative value of the drug dog’s positive alert in proving the
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presence of drugs, but it does not somehow transform the nature of the drug dog’s positive
alert to affirmatively indicate the absence of drugs. Cf. In re St. John’s Estate, 296 N.Y.S.
613, 618 (N.Y. Sur. 1937) (“[H]is utter unreliability as a witness[] does not furnish
affirmative proof that the reverse of his statements represents the fact.”).
Here, for example, assume the drug dog alerted on the residual odor in the
backpack. While his alert had no probative value in proving the presence of other drugs in
the truck, it in no way proved the absence of other drugs in the truck. This means the
(supposedly) unreliable drug dog alert could not have affected the probable cause already
established by the evidence seized in the courthouse because it could not have decreased
the likelihood that the officers would find additional contraband in the truck.

See

Anderson, 154 Idaho at 707, 302 P.3d at 332. Given that the information allegedly omitted
from the affidavit only undermined the drug dog alert and not the evidence seized in the
courthouse, it was not material to the probable cause determination. See Brown, 155 Idaho
at 428, 313 P.3d at 756.
CONCLUSION
The state respectfully requests this Court affirm the district court’s Minute Entry &
Order Of Probation entered after Mullins pled guilty to possession of a controlled
substance, methamphetamine.
DATED this 31st day of July, 2018.

/s/ Jeff Nye
JEFF NYE
Deputy Attorney General
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